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 Who can profit from dance? An exploration of copyright ownership 
Abstract 
 
Focusing on UK copyright law, this article explores ownership of the dance by reference to 
the work of disabled dance artists.  Our attention is on this group because their position 
within the dance workforce has always been precarious and so perhaps have most to gain 
through greater recognition of authorship in their work. Through an examination of the 
law as it applies to two different projects featuring Caroline Bowditch, we suggest that, 
contrary to the views of some, the performers are either authors of the copyright in the 
arrangement of the dance on their bodies, or joint authors in the work of dance. This is 
important because the author is the first owner of copyright in a dance; income from 
exploitation generally flows to the owner. With the rise of social media there may be yet 
further opportunities for exploiting dance. Starting from a doctrinal legal perspective, and  
bringing together dance and law to explore the vexed questions of cultural value, audience 
literacy and commercial exploitation, we hope to bring attention to the labour of disabled 
dance artists and the different ways in which all dancers can assert the rights to their 
work. In taking this approach this contribution differs from recent scholarship on dance 
and law, most notably works by Anthea Kraut, Choreographing Copyright: Race, Gender, 
and Intellectual Property Rights in American Dance (Oxford University Press, 2015) and 
Caroline Picart, Critical Race Theory and Copyright in American Dance: Whiteness as 
Status Property (Springer 2013). These analyses examine dance and American copyright 
law through race and gender lenses. Reading across the contributions would suggest that 
the time is ripe for a truly interdisciplinary project in which experts from law, dance and, 
disability studies come together to deepen and extend our knowledge and understanding 
of this area. 
 
Commercialise to survive: this is one strong message being given by the Arts Council 
England to the creative sector in the UK. In a time of tightening purse strings, alternative 
modes of financial survival have to be developed which do not depend wholly on public 
funding. One of these may be through greater commercial exploitation of creative 
outputs. Dance is no exception to this policy focus. Commercial exploitation of dance 
would depend on the exclusive rights granted under the copyright framework. 
Fundamental to developing an exploitation strategy would be to identify the author and 
owner of the copyright in the dance. This is an area that has been underexplored in law: 
there is little case law or literature on dance and copyright, but there are certain 
assumptions within the dance community, though not often voiced, as to authorship and 
ownership. 
 
Drawing on our work as part of the Arts and Humanities Research Council funded 
project, InVisible Difference: Disability Dance and Law,1 and on our earlier published works,2 
this article explores the ownership of the dance with a specific focus on the practice of 
disabled dance artists. Their position within the dance workforce has always been 
precarious so perhaps have most to gain through greater recognition of authorship in 
their creations. With a focus on two different projects featuring choreographer and 
performer Caroline Bowditch, the article will question whether the law would recognise 
the dancers as either copyright authors of the copyright in the arrangement of the dance 
on their bodies, or joint copyright authors in the work of dance. This is important 
because the author is the first owner of copyright in a dance;3 income from exploitation 
generally flows to the owner so it could have implications for how dance and dancers are 
funded. With the rise of social media there may be yet further opportunities for 
commercialising dance, which could be a valuable additional stream of revenue as public 
funding is being gradually withdrawn from the arts.  By bringing together dance and law 
perspectives to explore the vexed questions of cultural value, audience literacy and 
commercial exploitation, we thereby hope to bring attention to the labour of disabled 




The case studies 
Our focus is on two dance projects that both feature Bowditch with whom we have been 
working closely during the currency of our InVisible Difference project.  Each provides a 
case study to reflect on the extent to which disabled dancers are in a position to claim a 
particular right of ownership in the dance they create and/or perform. Bowditch is one 
of the dancers in our first case study, Love Games (2012) choreographed by Joan Clevillé 
for Scottish Dance Theatre. Our second case study, Falling in Love with Frida (2014), was 
created and performed by Bowditch accompanied by Welly O’Brien and Nicole 
Guarino. 4  In each case study, Bowditch fulfils different creative roles. Whilst in her 
interpretation of Love Games her input would be associated with that of a performer, she 
holds the position of choreographer in Falling in Love with Frida. However, as this analysis 
further explores the creative dynamics of each piece, it reveals a more nuanced 
distribution of roles between Bowditch and her collaborators. This discussion points to 
places where Bowditch’s input blurs the lines of any rigid distinction between 
choreographing and performing. We contend that those nuanced patterns of 
collaboration may be in part attributable to the dancers’ unique physicality. Further, we 
explore the degree to which the presence of disability in dance may shift traditional 
boundaries laid between choreographers and performers. Because many assume that the 
legal ownership of the work will be awarded to the artist who can be regarded as the lead 
choreographer in the creative process, the extent to which those boundaries have been 
shifted by the presence of different dancing bodies becomes a pertinent question for 
both dancers and lawyers.  
 
Love Games 
Clevillé choreographed Love Games in 2011. His piece stages a duet expressing on stage a 
male-female relationship exploring the dynamics of a male/female relationship that is 
playful and affectionate. Originally interpreted by two non-disabled performers, Naomi 
Murray and Jori Kerremans, Love Games conveys moments of gentle touching, 
embracing, and lyrical lifts and swoops are interspersed with more dynamic 
confrontations. The dancing is marked by an easy fluidity, a spirited youthfulness and 
athleticism as the dancers move through a sequence of intricate entanglements. Murray 
conforms to the image of the ‘dancer’s body’; she is long-limbed, long-haired and 
graceful. Her femininity is highlighted by the male partner, the stronger of the two, who 
supports Murray and lifts her with ease. The performance upholds many of the 
conventions of a typically hetero-normative duet. 
In 2012, Bowditch moved into Murray’s role and imposed a new frame upon Love Games 
where traditional gender roles are blurred. The female ‘dancerly body’ is refracted 
through the very different physicality of Bowditch dancing in her wheelchair. In many 
ways the recasting illustrates the translation of a role from one dancer to another but 
within a mainstream theatre dance context it amplifies the politics of translation and 
adaptation. Bowditch’s wheelchair opens up a different dialogue on the stage space.  So 
often a powerful signifier of disability/immobility, her wheelchair is now enabling, 
signifying mobility, independence and the power to support. Bowditch manoeuvres her 
chair with a technical virtuosity equal to the technical feats of the non-disabled dancers, 
integrating the chair into her dancing in a way that chimes with Albright’s description of 
Charlene Curtiss’s dancing: 
[Curtiss] claims the chair as an extension to her own body [and] revises 
the cultural significance of the chair, expanding its legibility as a signal of 
the handicapped into a sign of embodiment.5 
Bowditch’s chair acts as her partner, supporter and transporter. Although Bowditch’s 
recasting may not be aimed at gender re-balance, her control of the chair diminishes the 
role of her male partner, making his role equal to her own. Murray’s version concludes 
with the rest of the ensemble entering and interrupting the duo on stage and she moves 
away from her partner; Bowditch’s ends with the duo alone on the stage. She turns first 
towards and then away from the audience and moves in a lilting pathway upstage as the 
man stands away, leaving the space to Bowditch. It has a wistful quality, but she seems 
neither forlorn nor abandoned.  
An extract of Bowditch’s recasting of Love Games is available online. 6  In the film, 
Bowditch has re-composed the two ‘versions’ of the duet to run on screen side-by-side. 
On the left, the ‘original’ version features Murray and Kerremans. The second video 
captures Bowditch’s performance of Cleville’s piece with the same male partner. 
Bowditch’s screen composition emphasises the connections and differences between the 
two versions whilst also placing herself in an authorial position by inventing a new 
version that creatively juxtaposes the two duets.  
 
 
Falling in Love with Frida 
The second work is Falling in Love with Frida (FILF) choreographed by Bowditch and 
which premiered in May 2014. 7  Made for gallery spaces and designed to create an 
intimate relationship with a small audience, FILF developed out of a period of research 
into Mexican artist Frida Kahlo (1907-1954), known for her art, particularly her portraits, 
and not so much her disability. Bowditch’s project is part homage, part re-imagination of 
Kahlo’s relationship with her changed body post a devastating accident, and part 
reflection on how disability has intervened in the twists and turns that her own life has 
taken towards her career as dance/performance artist. A series of danced vignettes reveal 
different episodes in Bowditch’s life intertwined with Kahlo’s. Bowditch performs 
pleasure in telling stories about her own sexual experiences, frankly sharing the realities 
of what it means to have sex as a disabled woman. But it is less clear whether this is real 
or fiction, invented for the performance as a reflection on Khalo’s own emerging 
sexuality or contrived as Bowditch’s imagined relationship with Khalo. By finding a 
theatrical form for her ‘love affair’ with Kahlo, Bowditch is showing us something of 
Kahlo’s hidden life, the life behind the paintings. The shifting gaze between Bowditch 
and Kahlo, between the visual artist able to ‘hide’ her disabled body from the viewer and 
performing artist who puts her body on show, between the artist of the past and the 
contemporary performer, inscribes the multiple layers operating within the work as well 
as the multiple gazes that the disabled performer is subject to. Bowditch is both narrator 
and central character, joined by the other performers who dance with her or dance out 
the layers of the narrative through their own collaboratively choreographed material. 
Bowditch’s desire to bring attention to Khalo’s disabled body provides her with ideas 
about how to transmit her and her dancers’ own somatic experience of physical 
impairment as source for creating a poetic performance work. Bowditch’s ‘curation’ of 
the dancers’ bodies seems to follow Mark Franko’s observation that whilst the dancers’ 
knowledge is inscribed in their bodies they are also led to take their own bodies as 
objects of transformable knowledge and language as material for different arrangements 
of corporeality. The choreographer is thus frequently the curator of the dancer’s body, 
taking that body ‘out of the carceral condition of discipline and into a culturally 
generative field of creative activity’. 8  And yet the work might be seen to de-centre 
disability; the physical disabilities of the dancers are neither accentuated nor hidden, the 
disability simply exists. What emerges is a poetics of disability that defamiliarises the 
body as it is normalised within performance practice. Bowditch’s role as both 
choreographer and performer is not unfamiliar, neither is her dance making process that 
encourages the dancers to be contributors to the choreography. In these cases dancers 
are often credited for their contribution in various ways but when it comes to attributing 
the ‘author’ and ‘owner’ of the work in legal terms, it is the named choreographer who 
usually claims this right. But the ontological nature of the creation and performance of 
dance complicates what might be regarded as a straightforward legal authorship and 
ownership of copyright in dance.     
 
Copyright and the dance 
Copyright and dance entertain a difficult relationship because the two disciplines 
negotiate with the notion of fixation on different terms.9 Whilst copyright entirely relies 
on fixation for its existence - it is when the dance is recorded that copyright in the piece 
arises10 - dance tends to resist it. Within the discipline of dance, some view the fugitive 
nature of the dance as presenting particular problems for capture; others point to the 
technicalities of the art form occupying both space and time as being too challenging for 
fixation.11 Yet the dance has also been referred to as fixed or ‘set’ in the ‘memories and 
bodies of the dancers where the bodies are considered material objects.12 For many, 
however, the idea of recording choreographic works remains an anathema:  the dance is 
meant only to be ephemeral – to exist at the time of performance where fixation ossifies 
the work.13 Thus, the capture, or recording, of the dance in some material form - such as 
in the film –brings us precisely to the tricky interface between the law of copyright and 
the dance.  
Copyright is a right that gives to the owner the exclusive prerogative to authorise or 
prevent the reproduction of the dance in a variety of different ways – such as by 
reproducing a film containing a dance, and making a film of a dance available on the 
internet. 14   Just as the owner can prohibit these types of uses of a dance without 
permission, so can she permit others to copy or perform the dance in return for payment 
– such as in the form of royalties. In other words, copyright is the legal foundation on 
which (commercial) exploitation of the dance can take place. One of the underlying 
justifications for the law of copyright expects artists to be more willing to create if 
financial returns on the use of their work by third parties can be secured. Simply put, it is 
a mechanism designed to encourage creators to create, which functions on the 
assumption that monetary concerns contribute to driving individuals’ creativity. Indeed, 
copyright is the legal mechanism through which the majority of our creative sectors 
operate, including the music, publishing and film industries. Unlike these industries 
however, the dance community has seemed hesitant about identifying and asserting 
rights. That is not because participants do not know about copyright: our research with 
dancers and choreographers has shown that many are aware of its framework, but it 
seems rarely to be of concern in their artistic endeavour. 15  What is rather more 
important, particularly to those who work alone or in small groups, is the process of 
creation of the dance and all that brings with it.16 The work of individuals and collectives 
tends to be funded through a variety of means including public funding.17Artists often 
hold a portfolio of jobs to support their creative work. In this picture, the exploitation of 
the dance based on copyright plays a very small part.18 However, given the tightening of 
the public purse strings and the focus on commercial exploitation as one strategy for 
financial survival of the arts, this may (have to) change. Once the dance has been fixed, 
and copyright in the dance arises, questions over authorship and ownership of the dance 
need to be addressed.   
 
So who has authored, and who owns the dance? 
So who has authored, and who owns the dance?19 To answer this question, the legal 
framework requires us to identify the nature of the work at stake first, and then, who 
made the right legal authorial contribution to that work in order to be regarded as its 
author by law. There seems to be a clear assumption in the dance community that the 
choreographer is the author of the dance and the owner of the copyright in it. This 
comes across in interviews with choreographer, 20 and in the literature both by 21  and 
about choreographers.22 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), which is 
the current act that regulates copyright in the UK, however says nothing about 
choreography or choreographic work but does provide that a dramatic work includes a 
work of dance23 and the author is the person who creates that work.24 UK case law on 
identification of a dramatic work is sparse.  It seems that a dramatic work cannot be 
purely static and should have some movement, and a story or action,25 and should be 
capable of being performed26 but we know little beyond that.  If we look at the case 
study examples above, is Love Games a work of dance and if so, is Clevillé as 
choreographer the author and owner of the copyright?  Is Bowditch the author and 
owner as a dancer? Or are both authors and owners? Assuming that FILF is a work of 
dance, is it Bowditch as choreographer who is the author and owner in the copyright? Or 
is it O’Brien and Guarino as dancers? Or are they all authors and owners in law?  
What is the dance? 
While UK case law on identifying a dramatic work or work of dance for the purposes of 
copyright is scarce, 27  the position is currently complicated by the development of 
jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CoJ).  Over recent years 
many copyright questions have been referred to the CoJ for interpretation, including 
ones concerning originality for the purposes of copyright law.28 The notion of originality 
is central to copyright: a work must be original in the legal sense for copyright to subsist 
in a work.  The CoJ has stressed that the European scheme of protection copyright 
protects works where the subject matter is original in the sense of being the author’s 
intellectual creation.29  What the work is called, in other words whether it is a work of 
dance being a subset of the category of dramatic works, is irrelevant.30  The standard of 
originality for all types of work is the same:  it is one of intellectual creation.31  To reach 
this level the author should express her creative ability in an original manner by making 
free and creative choices,32 and stamp her ‘personal touch’ on the work.33 Where choices 
are dictated by technical considerations, rules or constraints, which leave no room for 
creative freedom, then these criteria are not met.34 
In the light of these tests and looking to the reproductions on YouTube and on Vimeo, 
there seems to be little doubt that Love Games and FILF are both works of dance for the 
purposes of copyright law (where the word ‘work’ is used advisedly in the light of the 
CoJ case law which suggests that it may no longer be necessary to place a work into any 
particular category).  
What is the authorial input? 
The next question is as to what is the input that is necessary for the purposes of being 
classed as an author for copyright law, and what instead (or as well) might be considered 
in the nature of performance and therefore protectable by performers' rights. As with 
dance, there is only limited case law considering the authorial requirements in respect of 
dramatic works. In Brighton v Jones, 35  the Court considered whether a director and 
playwright were the joint authors of a play.  One argument was made in respect of the 
contributions made during the course of rehearsals.  The judge noted that one 
collaborator, Miss Jones, the defendant and the person claiming that she was the sole 
author of the copyright in the play, had produced the plot of the play in advance of 
rehearsals.  In addition, and while Miss Brighton, the claimant and the person claiming 
that she was a joint author of the copyright in the play, had suggested ideas for the 
dialogue, the decision on whether these were taken up were for Miss Jones.  These, the 
court found to be ‘contributions to the interpretation and theatrical presentation of the dramatic 
work’36 rather than to composition of the work itself.37  Thus this was not the right sort of 
authorial input for the law to recognise Miss Brighton as a joint author of the copyright.  
Miss Brighton would have had to have contribute to the ‘composition’ of the work.  In 
Coffey v Warner 38 concerning a musical work, voice expression, pitch contour and 
syncopation were found to be elements in the ‘interpretation or performance characteristics by the 
performer’ which was not ‘the legitimate subject of copyright protection in the case of a musical work, 
rather than to composition, which is.’39 So the performer contributing these elements to a work 
was not found to be a joint author for the purposes of copyright.  However, a number of 
observations can be made around difference that arise with Love Games and FILF.  
Brighton v Jones was not concerned with the input into the work by the performers, but 
rather by those in charge of realising the performance.  Further, it is acknowledged that 
where a dancer interprets the work of a choreographer, and there is no room for the 
dancer to make creative choices, then authorship of the dance resides with the 
choreographer, and performers’ rights are the appropriate mechanism to protect her 
interests.  But there is a real (and legally observed) difference between that type of dance, 
and a dance to which the dancer brings her own input to the creation of the work.  The 
more that the creation of the dance is an iterative, collaborative process between the 
choreographer and dancer, the more such input must be recognised as being of the right 
sort to be considered authorial for the purposes of copyright, whoever has made that 
input.   
 
What is Fixation? 
One final requirement for the subsistence of copyright in the dance that needs to be 
considered is the requirement of fixation, or recording, of the work. Although there is no 
requirement of fixation in the international framework for copyright to subsist,40 the law 
in the UK does require that the work be fixed in some material form:41 copyright only 
arises on fixation. What form fixation takes is left open and needs only to be ‘in writing 
or otherwise’.42  Traditionally fixation has been thought of as being in writing, reflecting 
the historical text-based roots of copyright law.  For dance, one of the more commonly 
used notation systems such as Labanotation or Benesh might be deployed, both of which 
have relatively modern origins, having been invented in the mid-twentieth century. In 
common with many contemporary dance works, neither Love Games or FILF have been 
notated but other forms of dance fixation are equally relevant including film and video 
(YouTube and Vimeo), as well as computer generated recordings such as motion capture 
and holography.43   
 
Bowditch and Copyright 
So what of the recasting of Love Games and of FILF?  Where does Bowditch stand in 
relationship to the authorship and ownership of these dances? Whatever may be thought 
of the fixation requirement, the parts of Love Games that are available on YouTube, and 
FILF on Vimeo have been fixed in a form that is sufficient to meet this prerequisite.   
Copyright law often recognises layers of copyright in a single work. If the choreographer 
is to be considered the owner of the copyright in the dance, it might follow that the 
dancer could be considered an arranger of the choreography on her body, similar to the 
ways in which musicians might be considered as arrangers of an underlying musical 
score.44 The dance may be ‘placed on the body’ by the choreographer, but there is room 
in interpretation and arrangement on and through the dancers’ body for authorial intent 
sufficient for copyright.  Bowditch’s arrangement of Love Games on her body, interpreting 
Clevillé’s choreographic intent, is visibly different from the dance performed by Murray. 
It seems unarguable that Bowditch’s personal touch is stamped on her recasting of Love 
Games.   It is only Bowditch who knows how her body operates.  It is only Bowditch who 
could produce the dance in the form that she has. So in Love Games it could be argued 
that there are two authors of copyright:  one in the composition of the dance, Clevillé, 
and one in the arrangement on her body, Bowditch.45  
And what of FILF? On asking Bowditch and Kimberley Harvey (who was involved in 
early studio rehearsals but not the final production) ‘who owned the dance?’ the response 
by Bowditch was that the ideas were hers for which she would be credited as 
choreographer but it was the dancer’s dance and they would be credited as collaborators. 
Overall however Bowditch thought that ‘people want to be part of it, not own it’. For Harvey, 
Bowditch owned the dance and it was her (Harvey’s) professional intent to interpret 
Bowditch’s ideas.  Bowditch certainly has the ideas, but such is her choreographic 
method that not only at times does she direct the dancers to interpret those ideas, only 
asking that they say if they need input, but also, from time to time, she intervenes to set 
particular movement sequences.  However, ideas are not protected by copyright,46 so the 
question here is whether Bowditch’s input is sufficient for authorial copyright. 47  
Observing Bowditch working in rehearsals it was clear that Bowditch does provide  
significant input. While she gives the dancers space to interpret her ideas, and, in line 
with the points made above, only Guarino and O’Brien who have performed the dance 
with Bowditch really know how their bodies will interpret the dance, Bowditch also is 
actively engaged in setting the dance on the bodies of the dancers as the work develops.  
The creation of the dance involves active collaboration between the three of them. The 
process of creation of the dance, its interpretation and expression on the bodies of the 
dancers, have fused in to one in which individual contributions are indistinguishable, and 
which, once captured, is a work of dance protected by copyright.  Bowditch, O’Brien and 
Guarino are effectively joint authors of the copyright in FILF.  
The question arises as to whether the position would be different with non-disabled 
dancers and choreographers.  Looking first at Love Games: although it might be argued 
that every performance requires at least some ‘translation’ from one body to the other 
every time the piece is interpreted by different dancers, whether there would be enough 
legal originality for the later one to be regarded as an ‘arranged’ version of a previous 
performance, is a moot point.48 The answer is likely to turn, in large part, on the creative 
space that the choreographer gives to the dancer to interpret the work.  If the dancer is 
to interpret it exactly as the choreographer demands, then, contrary to the position with a 
disabled dancer, a new copyright is unlikely to arise in the arrangement. Which leads to 
the somewhat ironic position that the disabled dancer may prefer to be treated no 
differently from any other dancer. That said, such a conclusion does not suggest that the 
law creates a distinct class of rights for disabled artists. Rather it stems from the manner 
in which copyright law operates and understands originality. This body of law looks 
objectively at what is presented by artists, and applies the law to determine whether there 
is the ‘right kind’ of originality in a work for the purposes of the subsistence of 
copyright. That, from a legal perspective, does not make disabled dance a distinct class; 
what it does is to make disabled dance original in the eyes of copyright law. That legal 
assessment would be no different from any other legal assessment of originality in any 
other type of work.  
The position with FILF is different because of the different process of the creation of 
the dance as described above.  Here, the way authorship and ownership of the work is 
allocated has little to do with the choreographer’s and performers’ disabilities.  Shared 
ownership emerges through Bowditch’s choreographic method in FILF that actively 
encourages each dancer to be a contributing artist. Had none of the dancers involved in 
the piece been dancers with disabilities, the same apportionment of rights would have 
arisen. Here the disabled dancer is on equal terms with the non-disabled dancer.  
 
Commercialisation of the dance 
As noted above, the author of the copyright in the dance is usually the first owner unless, 
in the UK, she is an employee acting in the course of employment in which case the 
employer will be the first owner. This is not the situation in the case studies discussed 
above as the dancers are not employees, and we are claiming that the dancers, as authors, 
are the first owners of the copyright in the dances. Therefore, as owners of the copyright, 
Clevillé, Bowditch, O’Brien and Guarino could share in the returns from allowing others 
to reproduce the dances in return for royalties or other forms of payment.  While some 
have doubted whether earning an income from such exploitation would be possible, it 
should be remembered that new revenue generating strategies made possible by social 
media are only in their infancy. One example is advertising revenue that is generated 
when YouTube videos are accessed and watched. For videos with advertisements 
associated with them, each time that a video is watched, a payment is triggered, a 
percentage of which goes to the owners of the copyright in the video. If an advertiser 
chose to be associated with a dance work in which one of the dancers owned the 
copyright, then she would be entitled to a share of the revenue – which makes it so 
important to identify the owner of the copyright. Many more opportunities are likely to 
emerge in the future. 
Such a strategy would be in accordance with Arts Council England’s (ACE) exhortations 
to the creative sector to make themselves ‘resilient and innovative’ 49  because of the 
probable decreases in public funding in the wake of austerity measures.  One way to 
achieve that, it concludes, is through ‘strengthening business models in the arts [and] 
helping arts organisations to diversify their income …’.50 Specifically in relation to dance 
the pages of the ACE website state that it will: 
… support the development of entrepreneurial skills to ensure that 
companies, artists, and producers have a deeper sense of their markets 
and how to position themselves.51 
 
The message from ACE is clear: artists (and art-forms) will only survive and thrive if they 




The message from ACE implies that in order to have commercial success in the market, 
dance needs to cultivate a greater sensitivity to the market.52 And in order to cultivate a 
greater sensitivity, there needs to be an audience for the dance. One strand of our 
research in the InVisible Difference project, was an assessment of how audiences respond 
to dance by disabled performers through three lines of enquiry.53  The first was through 
an analysis of audience responses to YouTube videos of disability dance; the second was 
by way of a survey of literary criticism of disabled dance, and the third was through the 
dancers’ own experiences of audience reaction. What emerged through three distinct 
strands was a single and consistent story: there is a significant mismatch between the 
ways in which disabled dancers think about themselves, their work, and the place of 
disability in that work on the one hand, and their lived experiences in professional dance 
on the other.  While they think deeply about movement content, intentions, concepts, 
presentation, etc., espousing notions of variation, transformation, and equalisation, 
audiences and critics are much less likely to engage with these critical aspects of their 
practice.  Instead, our research exposed that viewers tend to focus on binary concepts of 
bodily difference and deviations from the ‘normal’ dancing body.  The dancers might like 
to control or at least profoundly shape the ‘stare’ to which they are subject, highlighting 
the fluidity and multiplicity of identity, and the connectivity of people to their 
environment, technologies and others but doing so requires building relationships with 
audiences. 
  
The analysis of YouTube and critic surveys, and interviews with artists, revealed that 
audiences lack a critical language to discuss the work. Responses to dance by differently-
abled dancers, seems at least in part due to a deeply entrenched idea of disability being an 
individual physiological condition, and of bodies characterised by difference or variation 
being a transgression from the norm.  Such overpowering and largely negative ideas too 
often appear to blind audiences to the deeper (although sometimes more obvious) 
narratives being conveyed, and to the quality of the movement and structural properties 
of the work. While critics could play an important role in tutoring audiences, many critical 
accounts tend to reinforce a dominant discourse associated with a normative dancing 
body, focusing only on the disability or avoiding any reference at all to the impaired 
dancing body. Underpinning this shortcoming is the absence of an audience appreciation 
of the ‘viewing strategies’ facilitative of understanding and so better appreciating disabled 
dance.54 As a consequence, the disabled body continues to be marginalised and struggles 
for legitimacy in the professional dance sector. 
  
So while on the one hand copyright could underpin a developing business model in 
which dancers could share, the current state of audience reception for their work would 
mean that independent commercial survival – of the sort envisaged by ACE – would be 
exceptionally precarious.  Indeed, it is likely that copyright revenues would fail to fulfil 
the financial support previously granted by public funding. That is because the two 
sources of incomes pursue entirely different objectives and therefore interact with the 
market in different ways. Whilst public funding operates in part as a springboard for 
artists who are located at the margins to obtain initial points of contact with their 
audience, intellectual property incomes can only be triggered once artists have 
successfully entered their market and established the mechanisms for generating income 
through copyright. In other words, public funds enable artists to meet their audience 
without conditions of commercial success, whereas copyright royalties require artists to 
have found their audience in order to generate any stream of revenues.  Public funding 
and copyright revenues come into play at different times and serve different functions in 
an artist’s professional practice. The former targets communication of artistic works to 
the public, the second monetises its commercialisation on a mass scale. For this reason, if 
new business models are to yield positive change for the dance sector both financial 




We noted in the introduction that the strong message emanating from ACE to the 
cultural sector is ‘commercialise to survive’.  Whether or not this is a message that is 
helpful for the way in which the dance community is organised, or aligns with the 
common working principles of dance artists, we have shown that copyright law would 
see dancers with disabilities as authors and owners of the copyright in their dances.  
Using the rights associated with ownership, the dancers could commercialise their work 
in the marketplace.  However successful commercialisation depends on positive audience 
reaction to the work and a sophisticated critical engagement with the work. As yet, 
audiences find it challenging to judge the work on its merits.   
 
While disabled dance artists participate in educating their audiences through publicity 
materials and the work itself, they cannot be expected to act alone.  While the view that 
disability is a medical problem in need of a cure may be slackening its hold on the public 
psyche and thus challenging assumptions that disabled dance is primarily a therapeutic 
practice, there is still a long way to go before dancers with disabilities are treated on equal 
terms as those without disabilities. As disabled dancers and choreographers have told us: 
‘we don’t want to be viewed as great disabled dancers; we want to be viewed as great 
dancers’.55  If dancers are to achieve their aim of being viewed as great dancers, and to 
meet ACE’s aspirations for dance to become commercially viable using copyright as the 
legal vehicle, then it follows that more attention should be given to audience literacy.  
More knowledgeable audiences would help to bridge this liminal gap and facilitate 
meaningful and informed discussions over what is good versus what is mediocre 
(disabled) dance, a development that differently-abled dancers crave and deserve.  This, 
in turn, could help push production organisations (e.g., theatres and repertory dance 
companies) to make space for disabled dancers and productions of disabled dance, thus 
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